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Assuming the above to be true-that this use, maintenance or
grant of a right of way would be a breach of the restrictive covenant-
an injunction may and should be granted if the requirements of
mutuality and notice are met. It has been said above that, unless
there is some mutuality of covenant, purchasers of lots in a restricted
subdivision may not enforce the covenant as against one another.
However, it has also been said that a recorded plat embodying the
restrictions will be sufficient evidence of the quasi-mutuality of covenant
necessary to allow such enforcement, and in the situation here being
considered there was such a recorded plat. Further, it has been recog-
nized that constructive as well as actual notice of the restriction is
enough to bind a subsequent purchaser, and in the hypothetical situa-
tion it was assumed that the defendant had not only constructive, but
actual, notice of the restriction.
Finally, under the original hypothetical situation the defendant
proposed to act in his individual capacity and, therefore cannot rely
on the right of eminent domain as a means of breaching the restrictive
covenant. However, when the added fact is assumed that the defendant
is only asserting a right to dedicate the lot in question to the county
for the purpose of constructing the proposed extension to South Ridge
Drive, the question of eminent domain does arise. As has been shown,
however, it is very probable that this proposed dedication should be
held invalid for lack of acceptance, and for that reason the necessity
of challenging the county's right to eminent domain is averted.
CHARi~s R. HAmm
CRIMINAL LAW-THE LAW AS TO CONCEALED
DEADLY WEAPONS
Man, by instinct, has always been and always will be concerned
with his own personal safety. Naturally, this concern has led to the
development of numerous instruments which he has used both for
offensive and defensive purposes. These instruments vary in descrip-
tion to such an extent that practically any object capable of inflicting
bodily injury has been used as a weapon. However, they all usually
have one common characteristic: they are relatively small and compact
and capable of being carried on the person. In their evolutional
development an attempt has been made to obtain a maximum of killing
power from the smallest possible weapon. In trying to reach this goal,
man has used everything from a rock to the powerful hand guns of
the present day.
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If these compact weapons had been used wholly for legitimate
defensive purposes, arguments advocating regulation would be greatly
weakened, but, of course, this is not the case. Unfortunately, most of
these weapons are well known implements of crime and unjustifiable
violence, as well as a means of defense. Many are directly associated
with the underworld, not necessarily the organized underworld, but
with the petty thief, the hold-up man and the burglar. Hence the
danger in not limiting the carrying of such weapons is readily seen.
Not so apparent, however, is the danger in permitting the non-criminal
element to carry weapons at will, without regulation. The danger there
lies in the fact that often tempers are suddenly aroused with the
result that a conveniently carried weapon produces death or serious
bodily harm. In most cases, such a result could have been averted
had not one of the participants been armed with a concealed weapon.
A question which immediately arises in connection with the last
sentence is: would not the same injury have occurred had the weapon
been -carried openly? In other words: Should not the same public
policy apply in regulating the carrying of unconcealed weapons as
concealed weapons? The answer is that the policy is not the same
since there is a stronger desire and need to regulate the latter, i.e., the
carrying of concealed weapons. The reasons for this differentiation are
three-fold. First, it may be strongly contended that when a weapon
is carried openly an affray or brawl may be averted because would-be
participants will not be as anxious to engage in combat when they
know that a deadly or dangerous weapon may be used against them.
Second, for centuries, civilization has abhorred the sneak attack and
has always disfavored the unfair fight among individuals. It is the
concealed weapon which produces unfairness and it is this one element
which the lawmakers have sought to eliminate. Third, through the
regulation of concealed weapons, it is thought that the populace
(which includes the hoodlums and criminals) will be deterred from
going about armed and ready for offense or defense since most people,
if permitted, will not carry a gun or knife openly, but would rather
carry it hidden from view.
This stronger policy toward regulating the carrying of concealed
weapons is borne out by the fact that all the forty-eight states have
statutes regulating the carrying of concealed deadly weapons, while
a lesser number do not prohibit the open carrying of such weapons.
It is not to be inferred from what has been stated that the carrying
of concealed weapons by those other than law enforcement officers
cannot sometimes be justified. There are those who, at times, should
be permitted to carry a concealed weapon. For instance, the person
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who buys a pistol from a store should be allowed to take it home in
the box in which it came. Or the owner of a pistol should be permitted
to take it to a repair shop without fear that he may serve a sentence
in the penitentiary if an officer discovers the gun. Other situations
which justify the carrying of a concealed gun include those involving
the sportsman or target shooter. Target shooting is a sport increasing
in popularity, and more and more guns -are being sold for this purpose.
Should not one who travels to and from various gun clubs and shooting
matches be exempt from the statutes in question? Another group
includes the hunter and the farmer who also have legitimate purposes
in owning and using guns.
These are a few of the problems which a useful and workable
statute should dispose of; however, it is surprising how few are that
complete. Most of them give these considerations little or no treat-
ment and the treatment that is given is usually both indirect and
inadequate. However, it is with these statutes with which the legal
forces of this country must work, regardless of their impracticability.
It is the construction placed on these statutes which forms the subject
matter of this article. While this is not a statutory study in the sense
that all the state statutes will be cited and divided into various cate-
gories, it is the product of a study of the statutes. An attempt has
been made to clarify the problems which frequently arise under most
of the statutes. These problems are usually general in nature because
the basic prohibition of all the statutes is the same, i.e., the prevention
of the carrying of concealed deadly weapons, although the penalties,
exemptions, etc., differ greatly.
A fundamental approach to problems arising out of such a statute
is first to consider the constitutional limitations involved. In the federal
and in most state constitutions similar provisions are found regarding
the right of the people to bear arms. The second amendment to the
United States Constitution contains the provision "... the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."1 This right,
however, is generally recognized as not being absolute, particularly in
connection with the regulation of the carrying of deadly weapons.2
Even at common law there were restrictions upon the right of the
people to go armed.3
As early as 1818, a state statute was enacted in this country pro-
'For an example of a state constitutional provision, see Ky. CONST. sec. 1,
where the legislature is expressly given the power to enact laws to prevent persons
from carrying concealed weapons.
' Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840).
" WVHARTON'S, Ci mmni LAW 2202 (1932).
KENT c Y LAw JouRNAL
hibiting the carrying of concealed deadly weapons.4 This statute was
enacted by Kentucky, a state which at the time was regarded as a
backwoods area where the gun was still the law. From this beginning
to the present day, the trend and end result has been court approval
of regulating the carrying of arms. This approval is based upon the
courts' belief that such regulation constitutes a reasonable exercise
of the state's police power, viz., the prevention of crime and accidental
injuries. With this idea firmly entrenched in the judiciary plus the
fact that all 48 states have regulatory statutes, it can reasonably be
inferred that there is at present no serious problem relating to the
constitutionality of the general type concealed weapon statutes.
A. DEADLY WEAPONS
It should be borne in mind that such prohibitions are against
carrying concealed deadly or dangerous weapons and not merely a
weapon. That the weapon must be dangerous or deadly is an essential
element of the crime. In discussing what is and what is not a deadly
or dangerous weapon, it is convenient to divide them into two cate-
gories: (1) non-firearms, and (2) firearms.
Non-firearms are often enumerated in such statutes. A common
listing would probably include some or most of the following: black-
jacks, billies, bludgeons, metallic knucks, sling shots, dirks and stilettos.
Even when there is such an enumeration the phrase "or other deadly
or dangerous weapons" is used so that the statute will be all encom-
passing.5 Other statutes make no attempt to list the weapons but
merely use the term "deadly weapon."6
An often used definition of a deadly weapon states that a deadly
weapon is any instrument which, when used in the ordinary manner
contemplated by its design and construction, will or is likely to cause
death or serious bodily harm.7 This definition naturally excludes a
6 For purposes of this article, dangerous and deadly will be used synonomously
as their accepted definitions correspond when defining them as used in concealed
weapon statutes.
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 435.280 (1958); "(1) Any person, not expressly author-
ized by law, who carries concealed a deadly weapon, other than an ordinary
pocket knife, on or about his person, or any person who sells a deadly weapon,
other than an ordinary pocket knife to a minor, shall be confined in the peni-
tentiary for not less than two nor more than five years. (2) Sheriffs, constables,
marshals, policemen and other ministerial officers, when necessary for their pro-
tection in the discharge of their official duties; U. S. mail carriers, when actually
engaged in their duties; and agents and messengers of express companies, when
necessary for their protection in the discharge of their official duties, may carry con-
cealed deadly weapons on or about their persons." (italics supplied)4 Ky. Acts. 1812-18 c. 89. This statute was declared unconstitutional by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals in Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90 (1822).
'Acers v. U.S., 164 U.S. 888 (1896).
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great many articles which are not primarily constructed for use as
weapons but are frequently used for that purpose, such as hammers,
wrenches, razors, hatchets, etc. Usually such articles are not held to
be deadly weapons per se;8 however, they constitute deadly weapons
if it is shown that they were used or carried for that purpose. 9 In at-
tempting to prove that one of these instruments was being carried as
a deadly weapon, it would be helpful to the prosecutor's case to show
that such an instrument is not one normally carried for personal con-
venience or that, although the accused uses such a tool in his work,
he did not contemplate the use of the instrument for that purpose at
the time it was discovered upon him. For instance, a carpenter who
has changed from his work clothes and gone out for the evening
carrying a hatchet on his belt under his coat may be guilty of carrying
a concealed deadly weapon.
Firearms-the second category-are generally considered to be
dangerous weapons. The problems which most frequently arise involve
either a defective firearm or an unloaded firearm. If the firearm is
incapable of being fired due to a defective or missing part then it is
usually held not to be a deadly weapon. Examples of this are found
where the cylinder of a revolver is missing 10 or where the firing pin is
defective." If a dismantled gun is being carried then the question of
whether or not it is a deadly weapon depends on the length of time
required to assemble it for use. If it may be easily assembled and
used1 2 or assembled with reasonable preparation,1 3 then it would be
considered a deadly weapon.
Where the statute prohibits the carrying of a pistol, ,an unloaded
pistol is held to be a violation' 4 since, loaded or unloaded, the weapon
remains a pistol. Although it is not as clear when it is held that an
unloaded gun is a deadly weapon, this is the prevailing view.' 5 It was
suggested in a Mississippi case' 6 that to require the gun to be loaded
would be to read the word "loaded" into the statute. The court went
on to say that one might carry the gun unloaded in one pocket and
the cartridges in another pocket and thereby evade the purpose of the
'State v. Nelson, 38 La. Ann. 942, 58 Am. Rep. 202 (1896).
'People v. Vaines, 310 Mich. 500, 17 N.W. 2d 729 (1945).
'Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 190, 206 S.W. 2d 831 (1947).
' Bowman v. Commonwealth, 309 Ky. 414, 217 S.W. 2d 967 (1949).
"Hutchinson v. State, 62 Ala. 3 (1878).
"2 People v. Haskins, 76 N.Y.S. 2d 636, 190 Misc. 888 (1948).
"Cittadino v. State, 199 Miss. 235, 24 So. 2d 93 (1945); Schraeder v. State,
28 Ohio App. 248, 162 N.E. 647 (1928).
"Hathcock v. State, 99 Ark. 65, 137 S.W. 551 (1911); State v. Quail, 5
Boyce (Del.) 310, 92 AUt. 859 (1914); State v. Baumann, 311 Mo. 443, 278 S.W.
974 (1925); 74 A.L.R. 1211-1212 (1931).
" State v. Bollis, 73 Miss. 57, 19 So. 99 (1895).
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statute. But could not such a situation be given treatment similar to
that in the case where the gun was dismantled, thereby resting the
decision on the time required to make the gun ready for use?
It would seem that a better solution to the problem would be to
hold that an unloaded pistol is not a deadly weapon unless there are
cartridges nearby which may be inserted into the gun in a relatively
short period of time. If there are no cartridges it then may become
necessary to determine whether the gun, from its weight and size,
could be used effectively as a bludgeon. Certainly, a heavy frame gun
should be considered as a bludgeon on equal terms with a wrench or
hammer. The manner in which the gun is used or intended to be used
may be an important factor in deciding if it is a bludgeon.
B. CONCEALimNT
Another essential element of the crime is that the weapon be con-
cealed. The courts have used no elaborate formulae in determining
when a weapon is concealed but have merely defined the word in its
common and ordinary meaning. "Conceal" may be defined by such
words as to hide, secrete, screen, or cover. It does not necessarily pre-
suppose complete invisibility.
1'7
The test is often said to be whether the weapon is hidden from
"general view,"' 8 or from "ordinary observation."19 This test is de-
termined by a full view of the accused and not by a partial view only.
As previously mentioned, partial concealment is not a violation unless
the instrument cannot be easily recognized as a weapon.20 However,
a weapon is fully concealed if its surface is covered, even though the
imprint and outline of the weapon is clearly distinguishable. 21 Another
example of a weapon known to be on the person but still concealed is
where the gun was hidden after the defendant put on his coat but all
present saw it before he donned the coat.
22
C. "CAmYING ON OR ABOUT"
The two remaining elements of the crime are (1) the carrying of
the weapon, and (2) by the person. The first may be disposed of
briefly because the word "carrying" does not mean that there must be
- 68 C. J. 35 (1934).
" Carr v. State, 34 Ark., 448, 450 (1879).
" Avery v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 248, 3 S.W. 2d 624 (1928).
"Killet v. State, 32 Ga. 292 (1861).
Robinson v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 53, 268 S.W. 840 (1925).
Hall v. Commonwealth, 309 Ky. 74, 215 S.W. 2d 840 (1948).
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locomotion. In other words, one does not have to move to carry a con-
cealed weapon;23 possession alone is enough.
The second element presents more of a problem. "By the person"
is ordinarily expressed by using the words on or about [the person].
The words are most often used in conjunction with each other but in
some statutes only one of the words is used by itself.24 Possible uses
of these words are: on and about the person; on the person; and about
the person.
25
The word "on" has given no trouble to those who have interpreted
it. The ordinary meaning which is used defines it as being connected,
or in contact with, or attached to. "It signifies closer contact than the
word about and is not to be construed in the sense of adjacent."26
Applying this common definition, it can readily be determined whether
or not the weapon is on the person. If it is not connected or in contact
with the person then there is clearly no violation. It is submitted that
requiring the weapon to be on the person is too harsh a requirement
for conviction, since it seriously impairs the effectiveness of the statute.
Many times a weapon nearby may be procured and used with less
effort than one which is on the person.
While there are some state statutes which use only the word
"about", interpreting it the same as the word on, the majority do not
restrict it to such a limited meaning. Ordinarily, "about" is said to in-
clude the definition of "on" plus "near", "nearby", and "close at hand."27
It is in defining the about and on and about statutes that the "readily
accessible" rule has developed. A weapon is said to be about the
person when it is readily accessible. This means that it is in such
close proximity to the person that it is within his easy reach and con-
venient control without materially altering his position.28 The applica-
tion of this rule most frequently arises in connection with violations in
automobiles, and it is believed that a clearer understanding of the rule
will be gained if a brief examination of those cases is made.
Weapons in Automobiles. It is to be noted that many statutes ex-
pressly prohibit the carrying of a deadly weapon in a vehicle, and of
course in these states the "readily accessible" rule has no application.
In statutes using the word "on, a gun concealed in a vehicle but not
-50 A.L.R. 1534, 1537 (1927).For a list of the states using on and about see 26 N.Y.U. L. RIv. 210, 211
(1951).
' There are a few statutes which do not use any of the possibilities of on or
about. Such statutes use the word carry only or go armed.
S68 C. J. 32 (1934).
-68 C. J. 32-33 (1934).
State v. Conley, 280 Mo. 21, 217 S.W. 29 (1919); Welch v. State, 97 Tex.
Cr. 617, 262 S.W. 485 (1924).
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on the person is not a violation.29 In comparing a case where this type
of statute has been applied with one where the word "about" has been
applied, it is apparent that opposite results are often reached. In a
Pennsylvania case,30 two loaded pistols were found under the seat
within reach of the defendant, but they were held not to be on the
person, while in a New Jersey case3' involving similiar facts, the pistol
found under the seat was held to be about the person, therefore, a
violation of the New Jersey statute.
Where a pistol or other deadly weapon is found lying in open view
on the car seat by the driver, it is about the person; however, it is not
a violation because it is not concealed. But if the weapon is covered
with clothes or the like, then it is concealed and readily accessible.
The same is true if it is on the seat or immediately behind the driver
on a shelf as in a coupe.
32
If the weapon is on the floor of the front seat in a handbag33 or
partially covered up by the defendant's feet,34 then it is about the
person. But when a weapon is concealed on the back seat or on the
floor of the back seat and the defendant is in the front, it has been held
by the Illinois court in People v. Niemoth,-5 that the weapon is not
about him within the meaning of the "readily accessible" test. The
court said that the fact that it was not shown by the prosecution that
the defendant could have obtained the weapon without moving from
his seat was a determining factor.
In the Niemoth case, the court apparently decided that it was
necessary for the defendant to alter his position materially in order
to have ready access to the weapon. It will be remembered that this
is a part of the "readily accessible" test, i.e., that the weapon be
reached without materially altering one's position. An interesting
problem arises as to how much movement is necessary to alter ma-
terially one's position, particularly in connection with weapons in
glove compartments of vehicles.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals until recently had not passed on
the question of whether or not a gun in an unlocked glove compart-
ment is about the person. But it had been decided that a gun in a
locked compartment when the key is in the ignition was not a viola-
Commonwealth v. Lanzetti and Lanzetti, 97 Pa. Sup. Ct. 126 (1929).
Ibid.
State v. Rabatin, 25 NJ. Super 24, 95 A. 2d 431 (1953); cr. People v. Liss,
406 IMI. 419, 94 N.E. 2d 320 (1950).
Hampton v. Commonwealth, 257 Iy. 626, 78 S.W. 2d 748 (1934).
"Welch v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. 617, 262 S.W. 485 (1924).
Clark v. City of Jackson, 155 Miss. 668, 124 So. 807 (1929).
'People v. Niemoth, 822 M. 51, 152 N.E. 537 (1926).
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tion of the statute.30 In Williams v. Commonwealth,37 decided late in
1953, the court held that the defendant driver was not guilty where a
pistol was found in the unlocked glove compartment of his car by the
arresting officers. At the time the accused was seated on the driver's
side of the front seat "under the wheel." The decision turned on the
fact that the defendant would have had to appreciably or materially
change his position in order to reach the weapon. The "appreciable
change" idea was borrowed from People v. Liss,38 a 1950 Illinois case,
where it was held that a gun was not about the driver of the car when
it was found beneath the middle of the front seat, six inches back
under the seat on the floor.
Considering the slight change necessary for one in the driver's
seat to reach the glove compartment it may be strongly contended that
the Kentucky case reached the wrong decision. Since most of these
compartments are equipped with push button latches, it is an easy
matter to open the compartment and reach into it in a matter of
seconds. The fact that the driver must extend his arm to the compart-
ment and lean slightly in that direction should not be controlling. Is it
not true that some movement must be made even to obtain a gun con-
cealed on the person? And is it not also true that a pistol concealed
in the glove compartment may be obtained as quickly in most cases
as one concealed on the person? The obvious answers suggest that the
legislature has taken away the privilege of carrying a concealed weapon
and the court has given it back, at least when a person is driving a car.
Not only is such a result an impediment to law enforcement by
lessening the effectiveness of the statute in regard to its original pur-
pose, but it also may provide the means whereby a pistol may fall
into the wrong hands and be used for an unlawful purpose. Pre-
viously in Kentucky, those who kept guns in their cars in the glove
compartment were required to keep it locked or else be charged with
violation of the statute. Now that this requirement has been lifted,
many careless individuals will not lock the compartment when their
car is unattended, leaving a lethal weapon an easy target for the not
uncommon thief who preys on unattended cars. It is a known fact
that a stolen pistol is an article of prize "swag" among the lawless
element.
D. Tm E LmNT or IN Nr
In completing a discussion of the essential elements of the crime,
something must be said of the requisite intent necessary to commit
Turley v. Commonwealth, 307 Ky. 89, 209 S.W. 2d 843 (1948).
' 261 S.W. 2d 807 (Ky. 1953).
s406 I9. 419, 94 N.E. 2d 320 (1950).
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the prohibited act. Most statutes make no mention of intent along
with the other elements, i.e., (1) carrying, (2) concealed, (3) deadly
weapon, and (4) on or about.
It is sufficient to say that the interpretation of most statutes making
no mention of intent has required only that there be an intent to
conceal the weapon. The fact that the person carrying it has no intent
or motive to use it unlawfully is immaterial. " 9 It is often said that the
gist of the offense is carrying the weapon concealed on the person
regardless of any unlawful purpose. The purpose of the statute,
which is not to forbid a carrying for use, but to prevent the oppor-
tunity to use it arising from its concealment must be kept in mind.
40
It is to be noted in connection with the element of intent that
there are a few statutes which expressly provide that there must be
an intent to injure or harm.4 ' Naturally in these states the intent
necessary for a conviction must conform with the statutory require-
ment. Along these same lines, there are also decisions which require
that an intent other than merely to conceal must be shown although
the statute contains no such requirement.42 However, it is believed
that in these states, the judiciary exceeds its bounds by reading
words into the statutes which are not present. In a number of other
jurisdictions, the purpose for which the weapon is carried may be of a
kind permitted by the particular state statute such as for purposes of
repair, sale, or moving from one abode or one business to another.
43
There is, of course, no crime if the intent is to carry for an authorized
purpose.
E. EXCEPTIONS TO LiABxnxr
In all the statutes in this country exceptions to operation of the
prohibition are found. Two of the more generally recognized excep-
tions involve peace officers and licensees. Peace officers and those of
similar occupations are usually permitted the exception only when
they are in the exercise of their official duty;44 however, this is not
much of a restriction on the exception since a policeman may at
practically any time conveniently find himself in the exercise of his
duty, or traveling to or from the place of performance of his duty.45
He is also limited in that the exception usually applies only in the
'People v. Syed Shah, 91 Cal. App. 2d 716, 205 P. 2d 1081 (1949).
40 56 Am. Jr. 998, citing ANN. GAS. 1912 A. 1207, 1209.
" For example see VT. PuB. LAws sec. 8274 (1947).
" See Foster v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. 44, 126 S.W. 1155 (1910).
'For example see WAsH. BEv. CODE see. 9, 41.060 (1951).
"People v. Boa, 148 M. App. 856 (1908).
4MWallace v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 283, 246 S.W. 466 (1928).
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area in which he has jurisdiction, or when on official business outside
his jurisdiction.46 But since those who enforce the law are fellow
policemen, this qualification may often be overlooked.
Many states, along with the designated exceptions, make it pos-
sible for persons with good reasons to obtain permits or licenses to
carry concealed weapons. The authority to issue the licenses usually
rests with the town aldermen, mayor, police chief or other town
official or commission. One statute requires that the person desiring
to carry a deadly weapon concealed need only obtain the written
consent of a peace officer to exempt him from the statute.47 It can
readily be seen that unless an impartial board is set up which has to
follow rigid standards in deciding whether or not to issue a license,
the basis for issuing a license may be the -applicant's political con-
nections, rather than a meritorious reason. However, a properly
organized board established for the purposes of granting these permits
could perform a valuable public service. Not only would it serve
those who actually need to carry a weapon but it would also serve
as a local registration point for firearms for which permits are issued,
and also as a registry of the names of known carriers of firearms.
Such readily available information might at times be invaluable in
aiding various police investigations.
Other notable exceptions extend to certain federal officers, mem-
bers of the armed services on certain occasions, bank and express
messengers, night watchmen, travelers, state militia on duty and per-
sons threatened with attack.
Exceptions dealing with the place where a weapon may be carried
are also often found in the statutes. The most common exception
allows a person to carry a concealed weapon upon his home premises
or at his place of business, 48 but when no exception as to place is
mentioned, those upon their own premises are subjected to a violation
of the statute.49 It often comes as quite a shock when one learns that
he cannot carry a gun hidden in his pocket in his own house without
violating the statute, but in most states, as in Kentucky, that is the law.
F. PENALTIES
The penalties provided for violation of the statutes vary as much
as do the statutes themselves. In one state a person may be fined only
$100.00 for the offense, while in a neighboring state, he may be
18 73 A.L.R. 845-847 (1931).
'7 UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 103, see. 2-4 (1943).
" For example, see IND. STAT. ANN. sec. 10-4737 (Bums 1942).
"Dunston v. State, 124 Ala. 89, 27 So. 333 (1900); 73 A.L.R. 839 (1931).
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sentenced to several years in the state penitentiary. However, in most
states the crime is a misdemeanor only. In some states, the first offense
is a misdemeanor and subsequent violations are felonies. In Ken-
tucky, the offense was changed in 1946 from a misdemeanor to a
felony in the hope that with the attaching of a greater penalty more
people would be deterred from carrying concealed weapons. Ap-
parently, however, the new penalty is too severe because juries have
been reluctant to find guilty one accused of the crime. Possibly in
Kentucky, a state comprised of people either rightfully or wrongfully
known for their gun-toting propensities, it is too much to ask of a jury
to find a fellow citizen guilty of a crime which will subject him to a
minimum of two years in the state penitentiary.
CONCLUSION
In concluding, it should be reiterated that the present weapon
laws, because of their varied nature, present quite a problem. This
is particularly true in regard to those persons who travel from state
to state and carry weapons with them-usually guns-for protection,
target shooting, hunting or other legitimate purposes. The problems
which arise are not due solely to the law in connection with carrying
concealed weapons but rather to carrying weapons in general.
In many states it is unlawful to carry a weapon in a vehicle without
a license, and in some it is unlawful to carry a weapon at all without
a license. In most of these states, no provision is made for non-
residents and therefore it is not an authorized practice to recognize
out-of-state licenses granted to persons permitting them to carry a
concealed deadly weapon or to carry such a weapon in a car. But
this is not to say that all non-residents found violating gun laws will
be sentenced to serve a jail sentence, because numerous unheard of
cases are disposed of by law enforcement officers, or by justices of the
peace. If a reputable citizen is traveling through another state with
a pistol in his car in violation of the state law but not of the law of
his own state, the chances are that he will not be penalized if he is
able to undergo a thorough investigation by an officer, which may
include a time consuming check with the police of the citizen's home-
state. On the other hand, he might have to pay the minimum fine
and also lose his gun, the total of which could be quite expensive,
without even considering the time lost. Possibly a solution to the
problem involving non-residents would be to permit the law of the
offender's domicile to govern.
The police and also the victims of hold-ups and armed assaults
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complain that too many people carry guns, and they clamor for more
strict laws; the average citizen, who knows of no reason why a person
other than a policeman should carry a weapon, joins in and is swayed
by the vast amount of publicity given the latest local shooting affray.
On the other hand, sportsmen, hunters, and others, backed by such
organizations as the National Rifle Association and the arms and am-
munitions companies, ask for more lenient legislation. The lawmakers,
who are in the middle, ofttimes please no one. But this does not mean
that there is not a happy medium between the advocates of both
arguments. Some believe that the solution can be found in the
Uniform Pistol Act.50 This act, which has been withdrawn for further
study by the National Conference of Commissioners, provides briefly:
(1) requirement of a license to carry a pistol either openly or con-
cealed; (2) regulation of the sale of pistols; (3) denial to criminals
and certain others the use of and the right to possess pistols; (4)
exceptions to persons at home or at their fixed places of business; and
(5) exceptions to certain classes of persons including peace officers,
gun dealers, target shooters, etc. Whether this act is the answer to
the problem of pistol control is not a matter for this discourse to
decide, since it involves a number of problems which would require
considerable discussion. But even if it is not the solution, certainly
a state committee comprised of representatives from all interested
groups could come forth with a suggested act that would sub-
stantially meet the needs of the people and still control the frequent
criminal and careless uses of such weapons.
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RES IPSA LOQUITUR AS APPLIED TO
MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
The existence of multiple defendants or instrumentalities which
may have caused or contributed to an injury raises an interesting
question of whether or not res ipsa loquitur should apply in this type
of case.
As usually employed, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires
that: (1) the injury be one which ordinarily would not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence; (2) the instrumentality causing the
' For an example of the Act, see ALA. CODE Ar. tit. 14, secs. 172-186
(1940). Also see D. C. CODE, sees. 22-3201-3216 (1940); IND. STAT. ANN. sees.
10-4736-4751 (Burns 1942); PA. STAT., tit. 18, see. 4628 (Furdon 1936); S. D.
CODE, sees. 21.01-21.0117 (1939); WAsH. REv. CODE, sees. 9.41-41.160 (1951).
